Price 3.0
From Evolution and Games
A model with frequency dependence
We go back to the asexual model, but now we will take a model with frequency dependence. This will be a bit more complicated, but we can still use a basic, well known model. Suppose there are $N$ individuals. They are paired randomly, and play a game in those pairs. The game gives them payoffs according to the following payoff matrix
If qi = 1, then that means that individual $i$ plays strategy A, and qi = 0 means that individual i plays strategy B. Depending on the match, each individual gets a payoff πi. The next generation is drawn, as before, one individual at a time. But now the probability that i is drawn as a parent depends on the payoff, and not just on the own genotype.
We do the same procedure as before, but with a few different starting points.
An A mutant in a population of B's
Suppose q1 = 1 and qi = 0 for i = 2,...,N. The probability of any individual i = 2,...,N to be matched with individual 1 is 1 / (N − 1).
The probability with which an individual i with qi = 1, who is matched to an individual j with qj = 0, is chosen is:
The probability with which an individual i with qi = 0, who is matched to an individual j with qj = 0, is chosen is:
The probability with which an individual i with qi = 0, who is matched to an individual j with qj = 1, is chosen is:
We can also compute the covariance of these two actual random variables. Let us start by computing expectations...
For symmetry reasons...
[show details]
The Covariance is thus...